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Źródła ciepła i energii elektrycznej/Sources of heat and electricity

The paradox of structural transformation:

Decarbonization through energy supply

limitation in Germany (2000–2025)

Paradoks transformacji strukturalnej: Dekarbonizacja poprzez ograniczenie

podaży energii w Niemczech (2000–2025)

ZIEMOWIT MIŁOSZ MALECHA, PIOTR GRĄDZIK

DOI: 10.17512/INSTAL.2026.06.02

Analysis of the German energy transition between 2000 and 2025 reveals that the primary driver of CO₂ emission

reductions was not the expansion of intermittent renewable energy sources (VRE), but a significant decline in total

electricity production. While wind and solar generation increased by 215.4 TWh during this period, nearly 80% of this

growth was offset by the simultaneous phase-out of 171.3 TWh of carbon-free nuclear power. This resulted in a net

gain of only 44.1 TWh of low-emission energy, whereas fossil fuel generation fell by 190.3 TWh. The remaining

deficit of 146.2 TWh shows high convergence with the overall 146 TWh decline in Germany’s total energy supply.

These findings indicate that over 77% of the observed decarbonization resulted from reduced energy production

rather than technological substitution. The study suggests that without a systemic drop in energy demand, the current

rate of VRE development would be insufficient to meet climate goals, especially when coupled with the decommission-

ing of dispatchable zero-emission sources.

Keywords: European green deal; decarbonization; energy supply decline; variable renewable energy sources (VRE);

nuclear phase-out

Analiza niemieckiej transformacji energetycznej w latach 2000–2025 wykazuje, że głównym czynnikiem redukcji

emisji CO₂ nie był rozwój niestabilnych odnawialnych źródeł energii (VRE), lecz znaczący spadek całkowitej produkcji

energii elektrycznej. Chociaż generacja z wiatru i słońca wzrosła w tym okresie o 215,4 TWh, blisko 80% tego

przyrostu zostało zniwelowane przez jednoczesne wygaszanie bezemisyjnych elektrowni jądrowych (-171,3 TWh).

W rezultacie zysk netto nowej niskoemisyjnej energii wyniósł zaledwie 44,1 TWh, podczas gdy produkcja z paliw

kopalnych spadła o 190,3 TWh. Powstały deficyt rzędu 146,2 TWh wykazuje niemal pełną zbieżność ze spadkiem

całkowitej podaży energii w Niemczech, wynoszącym 146 TWh. Wyniki te wskazują, że ponad 77% sukcesu dekar-

bonizacyjnego wynikało z ograniczenia produkcji, a nie z samej substytucji technologicznej. Studium sugeruje, że bez

systemowego spadku zapotrzebowania na energię, obecne tempo rozwoju VRE byłoby niewystarczające do osiągnię-

cia celów klimatycznych, szczególnie w obliczu rezygnacji ze sterowalnych źródeł bezemisyjnych.

Słowa kluczowe: Europejski Zielony Ład; dekarbonizacja; spadek podaży energii; niestabilne odnawialne źródła

energii (VRE); wycofanie z energetyki jądrowej

Introduction

Variable renewable energy sources

(VRE), including photovoltaic and wind

power, have long been promoted as pri-

mary instruments for reducing CO₂ emis-

sions. However, the actual extent of their

contribution to emission mitigation and cli-

mate change remains a subject of ongoing

debate [1]. Furthermore, a recent meta-

analysis of global climate policies revealed

that a mere 63 interventions (approximate-

ly 4%) out of 1,500 achieved a measura-

ble effect [2]. The policies that did succeed

in reducing CO₂ were primarily those

prof. dr hab. inż. Ziemowit Miłosz Malecha ORCID: 0000-0001-8560-760X, Faculty of Mechanical and Power Engineering, Wrocław University

of Science and Technology, Wybrzeże Wyspiańskiego 27, 50-370 Wroclaw, Poland, Coresponding author: e-mail: ziemowit.malecha@pwr.edu.pl;

Piotr Grądzik, Independent expert in the field of energy systems security, e-mail: gradzikp@gmail.com

associated with forced energy transitions:

high carbon taxation (the ETS system), sig-

nificant subsidies for VRE, and stringent

regulations prohibiting the combustion of

fossil fuels. Research indicates that these

policies collectively managed to limit CO₂

emissions by only about 0.6–1.8 Gt.

Meanwhile, global emissions have risen

uninterruptedly since 1950 at a rate of

0.5–1.0 Gt per year, now approaching

the 40 Gt threshold [3]. Thus, the cumula-

tive effort of the "best" policies from the last

20 years has only been able to offset a sin-

gle year of the natural growth in global

emissions.

Furthermore, the influence of VRE on

power system stability and load manage-

ment creates major technical problems

and additional costs [4, 5]. A fundamental

issue lies in the current structure of the

power system, which effectively consists of

two systems working in parallel: a stable,

dispatchable system (coal, gas, nuclear,

and hydro) and an oversized VRE system.

From an economic perspective, the total

investment, operational, and integration

costs associated with VRE, such as capac-

ity markets, balancing, and the expansion

of dedicated grids and storage, should

only be compared with the value of

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6/2026

Źródła ciepła i energii elektrycznej

the fuel displaced from the dispatchable

system [4].

Additional challenges lie in the gap

between the theoretical generation potential

of VRE and the amount of energy effectively

delivered to the grid [5, 6]. The availability

of this energy depends not only on meteoro-

logical variability but also on factors such as

technological degradation [7, 8], the sur-

face contamination of PV modules and tur-

bine blades [9], and periodic shutdowns for

safety or maintenance. Furthermore, mutual

aerodynamic interference between adja-

cent wind turbines can significantly

decrease overall generation efficiency [10].

In this context, it is crucial to note that VRE

generally exhibit low capacity factors

and therefore must often be backed up

or replaced by conventional, emission-

intensive power sources to ensure grid reli-

ability [11].

Public and academic discourse often

relies on the Levelized Cost of Electricity

(LCOE) to argue for the economic superior-

ity of VRE. However, as noted in the litera-

ture, interpreting LCOE as a full system cost

is a significant methodological error. LCOE

measures only the cost of generation, omit-

ting the exponentially growing integration

costs—such as power balancing, energy

storage, and grid over-dimensioning—that

arise when VRE penetration exceeds certain

thresholds. At shares exceeding 20%, these

integration costs can equal the costs of gen-

eration itself [9, 10]. Consequently, a transi-

tion strategy that prioritizes VRE without

addressing the efficiency of the underlying

dispatchable fleet may lead to "over-invest-

ment," where the marginal cost of new VRE

exceeds the economic value of the fuel they

displace.

Another unfavorable aspect of this

approach is the reduction of the overall

Energy Return on Investment (EROI) of the

energy system [11, 12], which ultimately

limits the availability of affordable energy

and contributes to social and economic

decline [13, 15].

In the present study, a case study analy-

sis was carried out focusing on Germany —

Europe's largest economy and one of the

largest electricity producers. Germany

serves as a prime example of an intensive

transition toward VRE at the expense of

phasing out dispatchable sources, such as

nuclear power [3, 13]. The aim of this anal-

ysis is to demonstrate that VRE sources are

not capable of reducing CO₂ emissions to

the extent planned in the European Green

Deal strategy. Instead, the significant reduc-

tion in emissions is primarily linked to the

decline in total electricity production. This

analysis should serve as a warning, particu-

larly for countries that envision their energy

transition path based on installing massive

VRE capacities that significantly exceed their

average electricity demand.

Metodology

This study utilizes official statistical data

from the German energy system covering

the period from 2000 to 2025. Specifically,

the analysis incorporates data regarding

CO₂ emissions [14], gross electricity gen-

eration [15], generation volumes by specific

technology, electricity import and export

balances [16, 17], and the installed capac-

ity of various power generation technolo-

gies [18]. The data is based on gross elec-

tricity generation to ensure a comprehensive

view of the sector’s total output.

The unit emission intensity discussed in

the study is defined herein as the specific

carbon intensity of the fossil fuel generation

fleet (Coal, Gas, Oil), rather than the aver-

age of the entire national mix. Specifically

the unit emission intensity for coal, gas and

oil power plants (UEICGO) is calculated

based on gross electricity generation from

these specific fossil sources in relation to the

total CO

emissions generated by the elec-

tricity production sector.

Results and discussion

Changes in energy mix structure and

emissions

Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of

change in total electricity production (Total)

and production from fossil fuels (coal, oil,

and natural gas – hereinafter: CGO) in

relation to the volume of CO₂ emissions

generated by this sector. Analysis of the

empirical data demonstrates a distinct

quantitative and qualitative correlation

between the reduction in electricity genera-

tion from fossil fuels and the drop in carbon

dioxide emissions. Simultaneously, there is

a strong convergence between these trends

and the decline in total energy production

(Total), which includes renewable sources

(wind, solar, hydro, bioenergy) and nuclear

power.

It is worth emphasizing that despite

a significant reduction in total emissions, the

unit emission intensity from coal, gas and oil

power plants (UEICGO) remained at

a relatively high level, averaging 0.9 kg

CO₂/kWh until 2016, before gradually

declining to approximately 0.8 kg CO₂/kWh

by 2025. This persistence of high UEICGO

values is notable despite the successive

reduction of coal's share in the energy mix

(which dropped from 291.4 TWh in 2000

to 103.7 TWh in 2025). Figure 2 presents

these relationships within the broader con-

text of structural transformation, highlighting

the parallel process of phasing out nuclear

power (a decrease of approximately

171 TWh between 2000 and 2025) and

the dynamic growth of variable renewable

energy sources (VRE – wind and solar),

whose production increased by approxi-

mately 215 TWh during the same period.

Simultaneously, the import of electricity

increased dramatically starting from

the year 2023 (see Fig. 3).

Fig. 1. Correlation between fossil fuel energy produc-

tion (CGO), total production (Total), and CO

emis-

sions in Germany from 2000 to 2025

Rys. 1. Korelacja między produkcją energii z paliw

kopalnych (CGO), całkowitą produkcją (Total)

i emisjami CO2 w Niemczech w latach 2000–2025

Fig. 2. Structural transformation of the German

energy mix: a comparison of the dynamics

of the nuclear phase-out (Atom) and the growth

of weather-dependent sources (VRE – wind+solar)

against the unit emission intensity from coal, gas

and oil power plants (UEICGO)

Rys. 2. Strukturalna transformacja niemieckiego

miksu energetycznego: porównanie dynamiki

wycofywania energii jądrowej (Atom) i wzrostu

udziału źródeł zależnych od pogody (VRE – wiatr

+ słońce) na tle jednostkowej intensywności emisji

z elektrowni węglowych, gazowych i olejowych

(UEICGO)

Fig. 3. Change of capacity factor (CF) for photovol-

taic (PV), onshore, offshore sources, and import

(positive values) and export (negative values)

of energy in Germany

Rys. 3. Zmiana współczynnika wykorzystania mocy

(CF) dla źródeł fotowoltaicznych (PV), lądowych

i morskich oraz importu (wartości dodatnie) i ekspor-

tu (wartości ujemne) energii w Niemczech

6/2026 instal.pcz.pl

The relatively high UEICGO, despite the

increased share of gas in production, sug-

gests that there was no significant improve-

ment in the average thermal efficiency of

fossil fuel-based generation units during the

studied period. Furthermore, the balance

indicates that the capacity increase in the

VRE sector largely served to compensate for

decommissioned nuclear units, meaning the

real reduction in emissions was primarily

conditioned by the decline in the total ener-

gy supply within the system.

Specific emission intensity analysis

Table 1 details the changes in the

unit emission intensity of CGO plants

(UEICGO), the growth of production from

gas power plants, and the resulting unit

emissions from coal and oil power plants

(UEICO). Production from coal and oil (CO)

can be interpreted primarily as production

from coal power plants, as coal's share

within the CO category remains well above

95%. The values were calculated by assum-

ing a constant emission factor for gas of

0.55 kg CO₂/kWh.

While the combined intensity (UEICGO)

has declined due to a shift towards natural

gas, a more detailed analysis reveals that

the emission intensity for coal and oil

(UEICO) has stagnated at approximately

1.0 kg CO₂/kWh. This confirms that

the German energy transition has not led to

significant efficiency gains within the coal-

fired fleet even though the German energy

sector continues to depend heavily on

them.

The paradox of structural

transformation

Table 2 presents the detailed dynamics

of changes in energy production for the

years characterized by peak production

from various sources: CGO sources

(384.4 TWh in 2007), nuclear power

plants (171.3 TWh in 2001), and the

peak of total production (645 TWh

in 2017).

Comparison of these data reveals

a phenomenon that can be called the

"paradox of structural transformation".

Although the common narrative attributes

emission reductions to the growth of

weather-dependent renewable energy

sources (VRE), the detailed energy bal-

ance points to a different mechanism.

Table 2. Dynamics of energy production changes

in Germany for individual sources

Tabela 2. Dynamika zmian produkcji energii

w Niemczech dla poszczególnych źródeł

Category

Past

production

TWh (year)

Production

in 2025

[TWh]

Change

[TWh]

Fossil Fuels

(CGO)

384.4 (2007) 194.1 -190.3

Wind and

Solar (VRE)

9.5 (2000) 224.9 +215.4

Nuclear

(Atom)

171.3 (2001) 0 -171.3

Total

Production

645 (2017) 499 -146

During the period under review, the

increase in production from wind and solar

by 215.4 TWh was almost entirely offset by

the simultaneous phasing out of emission-

free nuclear capacities (-171.3 TWh).

As a result, the actual net gain of new low-

emission energy in the system was only

44.1 TWh. This means that as much as 80%

of the decarbonization potential of VRE was

consumed by the process of withdrawing

nuclear power instead of directly replacing

fossil fuel combustion.

Given that fossil fuel production fell by

190.3 TWh while the net gain from new

emission-free sources was only 44 TWh,

a deficit of 146.2 TWh appears. This value

shows high convergence with the decline in

total energy production, which amounted to

146 TWh in the discussed period. Therefore,

it can be argued that over 77% (146 out of

190.3 TWh) of the reduction in fossil fuel

combustion—and the resulting drop in CO₂

emissions—is due not to VRE growth, but to

the limitation of the total energy supply in the

German electricity system.

Capacity factor and system

saturation

Figure 3 presents the average annual

capacity factors (CF) for photovoltaics,

onshore, and offshore wind from 2000 to

2025. These factors are lower than theoret-

ically assumed, averaging 0.093 for PV,

0.186 for onshore, and 0.294 for offshore

(2010–2025). Furthermore, these coeffi-

cients have been gradually declining since

approximately 2020, illustrating the nega-

tive effects of significant system saturation

with VRE sources and other factors such as

technical failures, degradation, and signifi-

cant overproduction. The decline in CF val-

ues for VRE correlates with an increase in

Table 1. Change in unit emission intensity for coal, gas and oil power plants (UEICGO) and for coal

and oil plants (UEICO)

Tabela 1. Zmiana intensywności emisji jednostkowej dla elektrowni węglowych, gazowych

i olejowych (UEICO) oraz elektrowni węglowych i olejowych

Year

CGO

[TWh]

Gas

[TWh]

Gas

[%]

UEICGO

[kgCO

/kWh]

UEICO

[kgCO

/kWh]

2000 346.5 49.2 14.20 0.94 1.01

2001 354.8 55.5 15.64 0.94 1.02

2002 357.6 56.3 15.74 0.95 1.02

2003 377.6 62.6 16.58 0.90 0.97

2004 372.2 62.7 16.85 0.89 0.96

2005 372.3 72.2 19.39 0.89 0.98

2006 374.5 74.7 19.95 0.91 1.00

2007 384.4 77.5 20.16 0.92 1.01

2008 373.2 88.5 23.71 0.88 0.98

2009 343.7 80.3 23.36 0.88 0.98

2010 360.3 88.8 24.65 0.87 0.97

2 011 355.2 85.7 24.13 0.87 0.98

2012 360.5 75.9 21.05 0.88 0.97

2013 362.2 67 18.50 0.90 0.98

2014 340.5 60.6 17.80 0.91 0.99

2015 339.8 61.5 18.10 0.89 0.97

2016 348 80.6 23.16 0.87 0.97

2017 332.8 86 25.84 0.85 0.96

2018 314.9 81. 6 25.91 0.86 0.96

2019 266.2 89.9 33.77 0.83 0.98

2020 233.9 94.7 40.49 0.80 0.96

20 21 259.6 90.3 34.78 0.82 0.96

2022 264.7 79 29.85 0.84 0.96

2023 206.3 76.6 37. 13 0.83 0.99

2024 191.6 81. 6 42.59 0.82 1.02

2025 194.1 86.3 44.46 0.79 0.99

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energy imports, highlighting deep structural

problems. Particularly critical are the low

capacity factors for offshore wind, where

CAPEX and OPEX are several times higher

than for onshore, further exacerbated by

VRE sources "competing" with each other

for generation during the same meteorolog-

ical periods.

The socio-economic cost

of energy limitation

The observed decarbonization in

Germany is inextricably linked to a decline

in industrial activity. Between 2000 and

2025, electricity demand fell by 48 TWh in

heavy industry and 23 TWh in the service

sector [19]. This trend, often mislabeled as

'efficiency,' is actually a structural withdraw-

al of energy-intensive production [20].

Global corporations such as BASF have

permanently reduced their German capac-

ities, shifting new investments to China. This

'Capex leakage' proves that European cli-

mate policies are driving industrial capital to

regions where energy remains affordable,

often at the cost of global net-emission

increases [21].

The German experience serves as

a physical and economic warning for other

nations, particularly Poland. The Polish

'KPEiK' scenarios (WEM/WAM) [22]

propose a transition that may be physically

unfeasible. For instance, building over

20 GW of new gas capacity in 13 years

would require roughly 1/3 of the entire

global annual production of gas turbines,

where current manufacturer queues

exceed five years. Furthermore, the

demand for battery storage (19 GW)

in these scenarios would require approxi-

mately 10% of the total global lithium

extraction, creating extreme supply chain

vulnerabilities [21].

Ignoring the necessity of dispatchable

'cushion' capacity leads to structural power

deficits. In Poland, the current transition tra-

jectory risks a structural deficit of 14-

-19 GW by 2040 during winter peaks.

Without maintaining a stable base of con-

ventional or nuclear sources, winter black-

outs become a statistical inevitability, as

weather-dependent RES cannot provide fre-

quency regulation or mechanical inertia

during periods of 'dunkelflaute' [21].

A more economically sound alternative

for Poland would be 'Coal Repowering'—

modernizing the coal fleet with ultra-super-

critical units. This path could save the Polish

economy approximately 1.8 trillion PLN by

2040. While the current transition path

(WAM) leads to energy prices exceeding

800 PLN/MWh, a modernized dispatch-

able fleet could maintain a competitive price

target of 300 PLN/MWh [21].

Źródła ciepła i energii elektrycznej

Summary

The conducted analysis proves that the

reduction of CO₂ emissions in Germany by

approximately 47% between 2000 and

2025 was not the result of a simple substitu-

tion of coal with variable renewable sourc-

es. It was primarily conditioned by a drastic

drop in the total amount of energy pro-

duced. If energy supply had remained at the

levels of the early 2000s, the current devel-

opment of wind and solar energy would

have proven insufficient for significant emis-

sion reductions, as it would have first had to

compensate for the gap left by withdrawn

nuclear power. The German energy transi-

tion was thus based on two interdependent

pillars:

1. VRE expansion primarily served to

replace emission-free nuclear energy.

2. The reduction of total production ena-

bled the actual withdrawal of high-

-emission units from the energy mix.

These results indicate that without a sys-

temic drop in energy production (resulting

from structural changes in industry and for-

eign trade balances), climate goals would

have been impossible to achieve at the cur-

rent rate of VRE development and the simul-

taneous departure from nuclear power.

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